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Essays on the Economics of Public 
Sector Retirement Programs
Gregory Leiserson 
This thesis investigates the influence of retiree health and 
pension policies on the retirement decisions of public sector 
employees. Chapter 1 documents the central role of eligi-
bility for subsidized retiree health insurance (RHI). Using 
administrative records obtained from the Pennsylvania State 
Employees’ Retirement System, the analysis finds that the 
well-documented spike in the separation rate at the normal 
retirement age almost completely disappears in the popula-
tion of workers not yet eligible for subsidized RHI. A second 
set of results exploits quasi-experimental variation in plan 
design to show that increasing the service requirement for 
subsidized RHI stretches the distribution of separations: early 
separations occur earlier and late separations occur later. 
Chapter 2 presents a structural analysis of the retirement 
decision for the same employees. Existing models of the 
retirement decision treat eligibility as a fixed characteristic of 
the worker rather than one that evolves over the career. This 
chapter estimates a model of life-cycle labor supply and uses 
it to simulate labor supply behavior under different health 
and pension policies. Changes in the eligibility requirements 
for subsidized RHI induce dramatic changes in retirement 
timing that would be missed in models that do not account 
for an employer’s eligibility criteria. 
Chapter 3 turns to the defined benefit pension plans com-
mon in the public sector. These plans create complicated 
incentives in favor of continued work at some ages and in 
favor of retirement at others. The strength of these incentives 
depends on many factors, such as the age of initial employ-
ment and the number of years on the job. Because employ-
ees differ along these dimensions, the value of the pension 
benefits earned over the course of a career varies substan-
tially—even among employees with the same total earnings. 
This chapter investigates the incentive effects and distribu-
tional consequences of four stylized plan designs. It derives 
simple formulas for the accrual rate of pension wealth and 
the distribution of benefits under each of the plans and uses 
these formulas to gain insight into the incentives and risks 
they create.
Chapter 1  
Retiree Health Insurance and Job Separations: 
Evidence from Pennsylvania State Employees
State governments face unfunded liabilities of more than 
$600 billion arising from the retiree health benefits they have 
promised to current and past employees (Pew Center on the 
States 2012). The assets currently set aside to pay for these 
benefits cover only 5 percent of the accrued liability. Further-
more, struggling with reduced revenues and other spending 
priorities, states are choosing not to make the contributions 
necessary to fully fund their plans. In fiscal year 2010, Ari-
zona was the only state to do so. Rather than increase taxes or 
reduce spending on other programs, many states are choosing 
to continue on a pay-as-you-go basis and cut future benefits.
Unlike pensions, retiree health benefits have few legal 
protections and can be modified for both current workers and 
retirees (Clark and Morrill 2010). For this reason, reductions 
in retiree health benefits offer the possibility of substantial 
short-term savings for cash-strapped state governments. 
At the same time, any modifications to retiree health ben-
efits implemented for current workers will have important 
effects on the state workforce. Age and service requirements 
in many plans create large financial incentives in favor of 
continued work in the years immediately preceding eligi-
bility. Completing the last year of service required can be 
worth hundreds of thousands of dollars to employees who 
intend to retire immediately after doing so. After meeting 
the eligibility requirements, workers can keep their health 
coverage whether or not they remain on the job. As a result, 
employees’ effective compensation rates decrease sharply. 
Understanding the labor supply response to these incentives 
is both interesting in its own right and critical to projecting 
the financial implications of any potential changes in retiree 
health benefits.
To gain insight into the effect of retiree health benefits 
on labor supply behavior, this chapter analyzes the experi-
ence of Pennsylvania state employees. Pennsylvania’s retiree 
health benefits come in two forms: 1) guaranteed access to 
the state’s pool for all annuitants, and 2) highly subsidized 
insurance policies for annuitants meeting additional age and 
service criteria. In the last decade, the state has introduced 
new fees, restricted plan choices, and restricted eligibility 
for subsidized RHI. This analysis focuses on Pennsylvania 
for two reasons. First, when the state restricted eligibility for 
subsidized RHI, it grandfathered employees meeting certain 
age and service criteria under the existing eligibility rules. 
This grandfathering provision created exogenous variation 
in plan design that can be used to understand the role of 
eligibility for subsidized RHI in employee separation deci-
sions. Second, Pennsylvania’s public records law provides 
extensive access to the employment records maintained 
by the state pension system, allowing for detailed analysis 
of the effect of the state’s retirement benefits on employee 
behavior. Though obtained for a population of Pennsylvania 
employees, this chapter’s findings are relevant for a much 
larger set of public sector employees. The structure of the 
eligibility requirements for subsidized RHI in Pennsylvania 
is typical of one of the three common forms in which retiree 
health benefits are provided to public sector employees in the 
United States.1
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The primary data for the analysis are drawn from the 
member records of the Pennsylvania State Employees’ 
Retirement System (SERS) and were obtained via public 
records requests. The extract contains quarterly earnings, 
annual hours, and key dates in the careers of more than 
200,000 individuals who worked for the state between 2000 
and 2011. The period captures 115,000 separations, including 
nearly 70,000 retirements. The data are rich enough to allow 
for the determination of an employee’s eligibility for retiree 
health and pension benefits on any date in the 12-year period 
with a high degree of accuracy.
The chapter first investigates the effect of eligibility for 
subsidized RHI on the separation hazard. The eligibility rules 
for pension and health benefits partition the age and service 
space into five distinct regions. Employees who separate in 
each region are entitled to a different combination of ben-
efits: no benefits, an early retirement pension with self-paid 
health insurance, an early retirement pension with subsidized 
health insurance, and so forth.2 I estimate the separation 
hazard for each combination of age and service and examine 
changes in the hazard at the boundaries between the age and 
service regions defining eligibility for different benefits.
The striking finding of this analysis is that while the 
widely documented spike in the separation hazard at the 
normal retirement age is clearly present in the aggregate 
data for Pennsylvania state employees, it nearly disappears 
for the population that is not yet eligible for subsidized RHI 
at the normal retirement age. Eligibility for subsidized RHI 
at the normal retirement age during the years used in the 
hazard estimation requires at least 15 years of service. For 
the cohort of employees reaching normal retirement age 
with exactly 15 years of service, the probability of separa-
tion increases from 4 percent in the year before eligibility 
to 26 percent in the first year of eligibility.3 In contrast, for 
the cohort of employees reaching the normal retirement 
age with 14 years of service—and therefore ineligible for 
subsidized RHI—the separation probability is essentially 
unchanged. However, one year later, when this second cohort 
of employees becomes eligible for subsidized RHI, it jumps 
31 percentage points.
The hazard analysis also reveals the importance of eli-
gibility for subsidized RHI in motivating early retirement. 
Employees in their late 50s begin separating in meaningful 
numbers only after they become eligible for subsidized RHI. 
For example, the probability of separation for employees 
becoming eligible for subsidized RHI at age 57 increases 
from 3 percent at 56 to 15 percent at 57. Furthermore, this 
increase in the hazard largely persists in the years between 
eligibility for subsidized RHI and the normal retirement age. 
The effect of eligibility for subsidized RHI on employees 
in their late 50s found in this analysis is far larger than that 
found in previous studies. However, prior work has generally 
pooled all employees at firms that offer RHI, regardless of 
current eligibility status, and compared them with employees 
at firms that do not offer RHI. The data for Pennsylvania 
employees show that this can be quite misleading. Less than 
half of the state workforce is eligible for subsidized RHI at 
any age before the normal retirement age.
The chapter next turns to the analysis of a quasi- 
experiment arising from an increase in the service require-
ment for subsidized RHI. Effective July 1, 2008, the state 
increased the service requirement for subsidized RHI at 
or after the normal retirement age from 15 to 20 years. A 
population of employees nearing eligibility was grand-
fathered under the existing rules, thus allowing for sharp 
identification of the effect of the new eligibility rules using 
discontinuity methods. The more restrictive service require-
ment decreased the probability that an employee on January 
1, 2003, just short of the grandfathering threshold, would 
separate over the next 9 years by 10 percentage points, from 
73.4 percent to 63.8 percent.4 
As the decision to separate is a choice of when, not if, the 
object of fundamental interest is the distribution of separa-
tions over time. Using the same grandfathering variation, I 
estimate the effect of the policy change on the distribution of 
separations for workers exactly at the grandfathering thresh-
old. I find that the increased service requirement stretches 
the distribution of separations: early separations occur earlier 
and late separations occur later. Facing a more stringent ser-
vice requirement, some employees who would have worked 
until eligibility before the reform decide that the benefits 
are not worth the additional years of work required after 
the reform. These employees separate even sooner under 
the postreform eligibility rules than they would have under 
the prereform rules. At the same time, other workers with 
identical characteristics decide that the value of the subsidies 
is large enough that the additional work required is worth 
it. These employees work longer under the postreform rules 
than they would have under the prereform rules. The relative 
importance of these two effects depends on the age and the 
binding eligibility requirement for the affected workers in 
the prereform period. Older workers already eligible for a 
pension respond primarily by accelerating separations while 
younger workers not yet eligible for any pension benefits 
show no evidence of acceleration. In all age groups, some 
employees delay separations, but the number of employees 
delaying separation is modest at older ages.
Finally, I adapt the hazard estimation procedure to simu-
late the effect of two additional restrictions in eligibility for 
subsidized RHI on employee separations and on the value of 
the state’s health and pension obligations. I show that a five-
year increase in the service requirement for subsidized RHI 
before the normal retirement age would reduce the present 
value of obligations by nearly $500 million, or 7 percent. 
However, as such a policy would encourage additional work 
at exactly the ages when pension accruals are highest, I 
find that it would also increase pension obligations by $100 
million. That is, the increase in pension liabilities associated 
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with the restriction in eligibility for subsidized RHI would 
offset about 20 percent of the reduction in retiree health 
liabilities. In contrast, for a restriction in eligibility after the 
normal retirement age the pension plan provides additional 
savings. Pension accruals at these ages are low, and the addi-
tional employee contributions made by the individuals who 
choose to work longer in response to the eligibility restric-
tion more than offset the increase in pension benefits.
Chapter 2
A Structural Analysis of Retirement with 
Retiree Health Insurance
In the United States, people obtain health insurance from 
a wide range of sources, including an employer, a spouse’s 
employer, the government, unions or professional associa-
tions, and the private market (Fronstin 2012). In each case, 
the price paid for an insurance policy reflects a compli-
cated set of implicit cross-subsidies. Adding a spouse to an 
employer policy, for example, can cost much less than an 
actuarially fair premium. As a result, decisions not directly 
related to health insurance are affected by the provision of 
health insurance. One decision that is strongly influenced 
by individuals’ desire to maintain health insurance coverage 
is that of when to retire (French and Jones 2011; Leiserson 
2013; Nyce et al. 2011; Rust and Phelan 1997). Retirement 
often results in a change in the source of health insurance 
coverage, canonically from employer-provided insurance to 
Medicare.
Understanding the effect of health insurance on retire-
ment behavior has become a critically important policy 
issue. Increasing per capita medical expenditures have led to 
numerous proposed and enacted policies intended to address 
concerns about coverage, cost, and quality. These proposals 
include both those intended to affect the health insurance of 
the retired population (such as increases in the eligibility age 
for Medicare) and those directed elsewhere but which will 
have important subsidiary effects on retirees or retirement 
behavior, such as subsidies for the purchase of insurance in 
the private market that facilitate retirement prior to eligibility 
for Medicare.
Using a sample of public sector employees in Pennsyl-
vania whose decisions to retire are strongly influenced by 
the eligibility rules for the subsidized RHI offered by their 
employers, this chapter estimates a structural model of the 
retirement decision that can be used to simulate counterfac-
tual retirement distributions under alternative health and pen-
sion benefit policies. While previous work has documented 
the reduced form importance of RHI (see, e.g., Karoly and 
Rogowski [1994]; Leiserson [2013]; Madrian [1994]; and 
Nyce et al. [2011]), it can be difficult to find reduced form 
evidence on policy impacts relevant to potential future policy 
changes, as there is substantial heterogeneity in the design of 
health and pension plans across firms. Furthermore, existing 
structural work has lacked information about the eligibil-
ity requirements for benefits within the firm. Such work is 
therefore unable to inform discussion of plausible policy 
options—like those recently implemented in Pennsylvania 
and under consideration in many other states—that would 
change benefits along exactly this dimension.
The estimates suggest that restrictions in eligibility for 
subsidized RHI can be expected to induce dramatic shifts 
in the distribution of retirements. In contrast, reductions in 
found in previous studies. However, prior work has generally pooled all employees at firms that
offer retiree health insurance, regardless of current eligibility status, and compared them with
employees at firms that do not offer RHI. The data for Pennsylvania employees shows that this
can be quite misleading. Less than half of the state workforce is eligible for subsidized RHI at
any age before the normal retirement age.
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the generosity of pension benefits may have more modest 
effects. This difference in the behavioral response arises 
because eligibility restrictions for health insurance typically 
involve very large reductions in benefits in a small number 
of years and thus a dramatic increase in the financial incen-
tive for continued work in those years. Changes in pension 
benefits tend to have a much more diffuse impact over a 
much larger number of years. Of course, one could design 
cuts in pension benefits that do not have this characteristic. 
Crucially, the simulated retirement distributions produced 
by the model capture the interactions between the state’s 
retiree health and pension benefits and indicate that changes 
in employee behavior in response to changes in either health 
or pension benefits depend substantially on the employee’s 
eligibility for the other benefit.
The key contribution of this analysis is to exploit detailed 
knowledge of the institutional regime in Pennsylvania, where 
different employees become eligible for subsidized RHI 
at different ages, in order to estimate a structural model of 
retirement behavior that can be used to simulate counterfac-
tual retirement distributions under alternative policy regimes. 
This exercise contrasts with existing structural analyses of 
the effect of health insurance on retirement, which typically 
assume that eligibility for retiree health benefits is a fixed 
characteristic of each employer-employee pair. In addition to 
the rich variation in eligibility for RHI at the individual level, 
a second advantage of the current setting is the large size 
of the population covered by a single institutional regime. 
Because all individuals used in the analysis work under the 
same regime, there is no need to map the rules of a pension 
plan into a low-dimensional state space and no consequent 
reduction in accuracy.
This chapter builds on an extensive literature estimating 
structural models of the retirement decision. Like much of 
the early work on pensions (Kotlikoff and Wise 1989; Stock 
and Wise 1990), it uses data for only a single firm where the 
rules are well known and can be implemented accurately in 
the empirical analysis. More recent work incorporating medi-
cal expenses (French and Jones 2011; Rust and Phelan 1997) 
has tended to use samples drawn from the entire popula-
tion, allowing for a more general result but also forcing the 
authors to abstract from important institutional detail in the 
estimation for reasons of tractability and therefore sacrificing 
accuracy. None of the existing structural work incorporates 
data on the evolution of individual-level eligibility for RHI.5
Chapter 3 
The Design of Public Sector Pension Benefits
The overwhelming majority of public sector employee 
pension plans follow a traditional defined benefit structure.6 
When employees retire, they receive an initial benefit equal 
to the product of three pieces: 1) an accrual factor specified 
in the plan rules, 2) some notion of average earnings, and 
3) the number of years on the job. In contrast, the defined 
contribution plans more common in the private sector do not 
specify a level of benefits after retirement. Instead, they pro-
vide employees with a specified contribution to a retirement 
account each pay period. Workers then invest these funds in 
a menu of financial products determined by the plan admin-
istrator.7 When employees retire, they can use whatever 
funds they have accumulated in their investment accounts to 
support retirement consumption. In theory, and as suggested 
by the two names, the essential difference between defined 
benefit pension plans and defined contribution pension plans 
is the employee’s exposure to risk in asset market returns. 
In practice, however, existing defined benefit plans combine 
insurance against market risk with two additional—and ines-
sential—features: 1) a complicated set of incentives affecting 
labor supply decisions, and 2) a new source of risk in the 
adequacy of retirement savings arising from uncertain future 
labor market outcomes.
Traditional defined benefit plan designs provide substan-
tially larger pension benefits to those retirees whose work 
histories follow particular patterns implicit in the plan provi-
sions. By linking the level of pension benefits in retirement 
to the work history in this fashion, the plans create strong 
financial incentives for employees to follow these particu-
lar patterns of work and retirement. These incentives affect 
numerous different decision-making margins. The decision 
most frequently studied is that of a current employee con-
sidering whether and how long to remain on the job (Brown 
2013; Chalmers, Johnson, and Reuter 2012; Friedberg 2011; 
Munnell et al. 2012a). The plans also affect the decisions to 
work overtime, increase responsibilities, or pursue a promo-
tion. Similarly, they affect whether potential new hires accept 
job offers and whether former employees attempt to return to 
the employer at older ages after several years elsewhere. 
Whether the pension plan encourages or discourages 
work at any particular age depends on numerous demo-
graphic, economic, and institutional factors, including the 
age at which an employee begins working for a public sector 
employer, the existence and duration of any gaps in the work 
history, and the pattern of earnings growth over the career. 
Because employees differ along all of these dimensions, the 
incentives created by the pension plan during the career, 
and the corresponding value of retirement benefits received 
after the conclusion of the career, vary substantially, even for 
employees with the same lifetime earnings. 
By providing enhanced benefits to employees who follow 
particular patterns of work and retirement and thus creat-
ing incentives for certain labor supply behavior, traditional 
defined benefit plans necessarily provide reduced benefits to 
those employees who do not follow the specified patterns. 
Thus, the mirror image of the labor supply incentives created 
by the plans is a set of risks that an employee is unable or 
unwilling to follow the rewarded patterns. These risks can 
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arise for reasons beyond employee control, such as poor 
health events, financial shocks, government fiscal condi-
tions, and changes in government policy. Or they may arise 
from learning about preferences, consumption needs, and 
other personal economic conditions that cause an employee 
to desire to follow an unexpected career path. As a means of 
insurance against these risks, individuals may accumulate 
additional personal savings outside the pension plan. They 
may also be less inclined to accept the job in the first place 
because of the risk.
The primary purpose of this chapter is to provide simple 
formulas for the work incentives and the distribution of bene-
fits generated by four pension designs: 1) a nominal high-three 
average pension with actuarial early and delayed retirement, 
2) a nominal high-three average pension with percentage 
reductions for early retirement, 3) an inflation-adjusted career 
average pension with actuarial early retirement, and  
4) an indexed career-average pension with variable accrual 
factors and actuarial early and delayed retirement. The formu-
las develop our intuition about how and why existing poli-
cies affect labor market behavior and employee welfare, and 
they also facilitate the construction of alternative designs that 
preserve the defined benefit structure but allow for complete 
control over the other outcomes of the plan. For example, the 
financial incentive for continued employment in pension plans 
using high-three formulas, which base the pension benefits 
on a simple average of the three highest-earning years of the 
career, depends on trend inflation rates. If trend inflation is 1 
percent, the incentive for continued employment is lower than 
if it is 3 percent. It is not clear why this dependence on infla-
tion would be a desired feature of a pension plan. Similarly, 
the financial incentive for an individual with 10 years of expe-
rience to remain on the job depends on whether that individual 
started working for the public sector employer at age 35 or at 
age 45. Most arguments for retention incentives in pension 
plans suggest the use of service, not age.
A second purpose of this chapter is to provide a clear 
exposition of the incentives associated with different pension 
plans so that policymakers can choose to design plans with 
particular incentives. A common critique of proposals to 
replace existing pensions with alternatives that have more 
neutral work incentives (e.g., cash balance plans) is that 
such plans eliminate certain desired labor supply incentives, 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater. An oft-cited goal 
is to provide incentives for more experienced workers to 
remain on the job. The fourth class of pension plans exam-
ined in this chapter, the indexed career-average with vari-
able accrual factors and actuarial adjustments for early and 
delayed retirement, can be used to construct pension plans 
that achieve the desired incentives without including the 
irrelevant incentives embedded in current designs. It main-
tains the defined benefit nature of the pension plans while 
at the same time directly controlling the work incentives 
created by the plans, limiting arbitrary redistributive patterns 
across employees, and limiting incentives for individuals to 
manipulate earnings and labor supply in ways that do not 
advance public policy objectives.
The contribution of this analysis relative to previous 
analyses is the focus on simple analytic formulas that pro-
vide a framework for thinking about incentives in the general 
class of public sector defined benefit plans. As state and local 
government budget pressures continue to push in the direc-
tion of pension cuts, one way of reducing the harm of such 
cuts on public sector employees is to redesign the benefits 
so the plans use a given quantity of resources to greater 
effect. In such an environment, a general understanding of 
pension design will be crucial. Existing work has derived 
quantitative estimates of the pension incentives in particular 
plans (Costrell and Podgursky 2009; Johnson, Steuerle, and 
Quakenbush 2012); derived estimates implicitly in pursuit of 
some other objective (Samwick 1998; Stock and Wise 1990); 
or focused on particular channels through which the pension 
plans affect behavior (Diamond et al. [2010] on final pay 
plans; Munnell et al. [2012b] on vesting).
Notes
1. The three most common forms of retiree health benefits in the 
public sector are 1) access to the state’s pool with generous 
subsidies for the purchase of insurance if a retiree meets certain 
age and service criteria, 2) access to the state’s pool with a per-
year-of-service subsidy for the purchase of insurance, and  
3) access to the state’s pool with little or no premium assis-
tance. Intermediate and hybrid forms also exist.
2. Throughout this chapter I refer to the insurance available to all 
annuitants regardless of age and service as self-paid. How-
ever, the state contributes $5 per month toward the cost of this 
coverage.
3. To facilitate comparisons across age and service levels and 
comparisons with prior work, I report annual separation prob-
abilities rather than the instantaneous hazard.
4. The analysis examines the population of employees on January 
1, 2003, because the increased service requirement was formal-
ized in collective bargaining agreements beginning in 2003.
5. The model estimated in Gustman and Steinmeier (1994) allows 
for the evolution of eligibility at the individual level, but the 
authors are forced to impute the eligibility rules because the 
data used in the paper do not contain the relevant information.
6. This work builds on previous joint work with Peter Diamond, 
Alicia Munnell, and Jean-Pierre Aubry. See, for example, Dia-
mond et al. (2010).
7. In addition to the traditional limited menu, plans may offer a 
brokerage or mutual fund window through which employees 
can purchase a much wider array of securities.
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